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Abstract:  I offer four ways to reinforce Birch’s precautionary principle so it can be used effectively and 
practically in deciding which animals to cover by legislation for humane treatment: (1) add one more 
credible indicator of sentience to the BAR rule; (2) use phylogenetic classification, not the outdated 
Linnaean classification, to test which animal clades have sentience; (3) disentangle the pain of suffering 
from sentience; and (4) reconsider the sentient status of decapods and insects to remove potential 
inconsistencies in the proposed framework.   
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Jonathon Birch’s (2017) target article on the precautionary principal is a good contribution to the 
literature on animal sentience. It should have a positive effect on legislative policies for protecting 
animals. The writing style is excellent; the logic is clear; and although I am not an ethicist or an 
expert on animal-protection issues, I found the central proposal to be well reasoned and argued. 
That proposal was to set a rather low bar for judging which animals are sentient so that regulators 
can act in a precautionary way to decide which animal clades to protect so as to minimize the 
chance of causing pain. Birch has met his goals of clarifying how the precautionary principle 
should be applied to animals, and of making it more precise and practical. The list of behavioral 
criteria he used on p. 7 to judge whether animals have sentient feelings of attraction (positive 
affect) or aversion (negative affect) is well supported by the literature, so it is solid. However, I 
wish he had put more emphasis on the learning criteria, namely on the capacity for operant 
learning from reward and punishment, plus the new, ramped-up version of this, called unlimited 
associative learning (UAL: Bronfman et al. 2016), in which the initially rewarded learning can lead 
to more and more learning. UAL seems to be a very good indicator of whether an animal is 
sentient.  
 Birch’s proposal will help to correct some of the weaknesses of past investigations into 
whether fish and invertebrates feel pain. These weaknesses, as pointed out by Rose et al. (2014) 
and Feinberg and Mallatt (2016), are as follows:   
 
1. High ratios of anecdotal-to-experimental evidence.  
2. The experiments often did not distinguish nonconscious nociception from conscious pain.  
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3. Not enough recognition that sharp short-term pain differs from dull long-term pain — a 
problem, because only the latter type of pain is the basis of the suffering with which animal-
protection advocates are most concerned.  
4. Past studies missed evolutionary indications that only some animals have the suffering type of 
pain (those animals that can hide for a long time while healing) whereas others do not (animals 
that live in the open, exposed to predators that can spot the weakness of a suffering prey) (Bolles 
and Faneslow 1980; Crook and Walters 2014); this implies that short-term pain is more common 
in the animal kingdom than is the long-term suffering that raises the most concern.  
5. The behavioral studies of animal pain continue to dominate over the neurobiological 
(anatomical and physiological) studies of pain pathways. The neurobiological studies are just as 
informative but are few in number — and even seem to be decreasing for the very animals being 
considered for continued or new protection, namely, the non-bony fishes, decapod crustaceans, 
and the other arthropods.  
 
From among these problems, Birch has recognized and insisted that nociception must be 
distinguished from pain, that experiments must follow the highest scientific standards, and that 
neurobiological as well as behavioral studies are needed. Thus, his guidelines can considerably 
improve future studies of animal pain.  
 Also praiseworthy is his insistence that to be credible, any indicator of sentience in an 
animal group must be “an observable phenomenon that experiments can be designed to detect.” 
This acknowledges the principle, championed by the philosopher of science Karl Popper, that 
scientific hypotheses must be testable and falsifiable (Popper 1959). Birch presents the 
falsifiability criterion by saying the indicator must be subject to constant review, revision, and 
updating. If applied to regulatory policy, this will allay the political concerns of those who fear 
that once a clade is protected by legislation, it can never be de-listed even if subsequently proven 
to be non-sentient.  
 I like Birch’s practicality. He acknowledges that financial costs should be considered and 
that animals with lower-level sentience may receive less legislative protection than animals with 
higher-level sentience. He says these two levels of sentience are difficult to distinguish or define 
but I would call them, respectively, primary consciousness (raw experience without any reflection) 
and memory-enhanced consciousness (long memory of past experiences and some reflection). 
These levels are explained in the Feinberg and Mallatt (2016) book.  
I should emphasize that I am talking about practicality and political reality, not ethics. I am 
on record as saying that insects have primary consciousness and are sentient (Mallatt and 
Feinberg 2016). By practicality, I mean only that I recognize the near impossibility of any 
legislation being passed to protect the many million gnats and horse flies in the foreseeable 
future.  
 The rest of this commentary is devoted to my suggestions for improving Birch’s proposal. 
His proposed BAR rule says that “one credible indicator of sentience is enough to justify action: 
we should not demand multiple indicators before acting to protect the animals concerned.” His 
rationale for using only one is that requiring more indicators “will have the effect of further 
delaying action, and the purpose of a precautionary principle is to prevent such delays.” 
 To me as a scientist, one indicator is not enough. Scientists are trained to seek multiple 
lines of evidence and counter-evidence, weighed and then debated, in order to come to a credible 
decision. What happens to the BAR when a hypothesis is supported by one credible indicator, but 
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another credible indicator speaks against it? This is exactly the problem for the decapod 
crustaceans (e.g., crabs), which are heavily spotlighted in Birch’s essay. Decapods pass the 
behavioral tests for sentience, as Birch documents, but they have a paltry 100,000 neurons in 
their entire nervous system, which indicates they are not sentient (Fraser 2009). All the 
vertebrates, by contrast, have millions of neurons. Decapods’ 100,000 neurons are even fewer 
than in most insects, a group that also passes all the behavioral tests but that Birch does not 
consider sentient. My studies with Todd Feinberg uncovered evidence that decapods and insects 
are indeed sentient (Mallatt and Feinberg 2016), with insects just lacking some aspects of pain 
(Adamo 2016, p. 76). But that is not the point. The point is that using just one line of evidence is 
insufficient and may even amount to the lowering of scientific standards that Birch wants to avoid.  
 How to solve it? I understand why Birch designed BAR to require just one indicator, 
namely, to speed up the path to regulatory action because delay could mean more animals keep 
suffering from fisheries and in science labs. That is a valid concern. To minimize the added delay, 
I propose that just one more credible indicator be added to the BAR, for a total of two. The two 
indicators should be largely independent, usually one that is neurobiological and one that is 
behavioral, but that lead to the same conclusion from two different directions (and are not 
countered by a lot of opposing evidence). This will raise the “effort BAR,” but not by too much. 
Any extra effort and time needed to obtain the evidence for the second indicator will be more 
than offset by jettisoning the burdensome guideline that every order of animals be tested (next 
section).  
 The BAR criterion uses the traditional, Linnaean classification system as it proposes testing 
sentience in at least one animal species per order. This raises many problems. First, it would 
require a lot of animal testing, given the >60 traditional orders of fish, ~26 orders of mammals, 
>20 of insects, >100 of molluscs, >25 of nematode roundworms, etc. Birch recognizes this burden 
and offers a way to lessen the effort: focus on the most exploited orders of animals. But a better 
goal would be to find all the conscious animals without having to test so many. Second, because 
the higher Linnaean categories are subjective constructs, the orders of different animals are not 
necessarily comparable:  A mollusc “order” may have a lot less or a lot more animal diversity than 
a mammal “order” (Brusca and Brusca 2003). The third problem is that the traditional categories 
are considered outdated; so if the BAR rule uses them, it will lack credibility among modern 
biologists.  
There is an easy way for BAR to remove its dependence on “orders,” and solve all the 
problems. It can switch to a modern phylogenetic classification scheme that only names clades (a 
clade is a group of taxa that share a common ancestor) and allows the reconstruction of 
characters that were present in the ancestor of the clade. [See the Wikipedia entries on ancestral 
reconstruction and phylogenetics.] This means “sentience” can be chosen as the character of 
interest and charting its presence (or absence) in a mere fraction of the end-clades is often 
enough to calculate whether it was present in the ancestor at the base of the clade (in the first 
decapods, the first vertebrates, or first cephalopods, for example). Some of the models used to 
reconstruct ancestral characters are complex, but others are quite simple, especially those that 
use big characters like sentience. The program PAUP* (Swofford 1998), which is based on a model 
called maximum parsimony, is appropriate and quite easy to use (Mallatt and Chen 2003). By 
changing the BAR rule to include phylogenetic reconstruction, the many tedious experiments and 
brain studies on hundreds of animal “orders” won’t be necessary, saving much time.  
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 Even easier, one could just study the existing hypotheses about which animals are sentient 
(conscious) and then use reason to evaluate those hypotheses and modify them based on any 
new evidence. For example, Todd Feinberg and I constructed lists of criteria for sentience and the 
animals that fit them (Feinberg and Mallatt 2016; Mallatt and Feinberg 2016). We deduced that 
the sentient animals are all the vertebrates, all arthropods, and the octopus-squid-cuttlefish clade 
of cephalopod molluscs. One need not agree with this deduction but can still use our list as a 
springboard from which to reason out one’s own clades of sentient animals. Then, normal 
scientific debate could lead to a majority agreement, if not a consensus. There is hope that a new 
consensus could emerge, as belief in the long-held view that consciousness exists only in 
mammals (and birds) has faded in the past ten years (Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness, 
2012; Boly et al. 2013; Klein and Barron 2016; Birch 2017). 
 Those who empathize with animals do not want them to be hurt, so it is natural that 
animal sentience is so often equated with the capacity to suffer pain. But this suffering-centered 
view misses the possibility that some animals could experience negative affects (bad feelings) but 
little or no suffering/pain. Many fish, antelopes, and insects could be in this group. But negative 
affects, from continual discomfort to repeated short-term pain to prolonged fear, can feel quite 
awful even in the absence of suffering/pain. Inducing “misery” like this is also inhumane 
treatment, against which sentient animals should be protected. Pain is not everything when it 
comes to sentience. This means that more animals could come under protection, not fewer: all 
animals that can feel negative affects would be included whether they feel certain types of pain 
or not.  
 Birch is not to be faulted for missing the possibility that sentience can exist in animals that 
do not suffer pain — almost no one else considers it either. However, the distinction has 
implications for Birch’s thesis. It implies that he dismisses insect sentience (fruit flies) too hastily. 
And it provides an answer to the final request in his paper, for help in answering whether the 
jawless fish (lampreys and hagfish) and the cartilaginous fish are sentient. I assume his uncertainty 
stemmed from these fish lacking the sensory “C” fibers for long-term, suffering pain (table 8.4 in 
Feinberg and Mallatt 2016). Yet other evidence says that though not “long-suffering,” they are 
indeed sentient. The jawless and cartilaginous fish have many “limbic” structures in their brains, 
structures associated with sentient affects in all the other vertebrates (table 8.5 and p. 155 in 
Feinberg and Mallatt 2016). And the cartilaginous sharks and their kin learn readily from reward 
and punishment in operant conditioning (Guttridge et al. 2009), which is another sign of affect.   
 In summary, Birch presents a helpful and practical framework for applying the 
precautionary principle to animal welfare. As he requested, I suggest these four improvements: 
add one more credible indicator of sentience to the BAR rule, for a total of two; use phylogenetic 
classification, not the outdated Linnaean classification, to test which animal clades have 
sentience; disentangle the pain of suffering from sentience; and reconsider the sentient status of 
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ANIMAL CONSCIOUSNESS  
 
On November 17-18, 2017, the NYU Center for Mind, Brain and Consciousness, the NYU Center for Bioethics, and NYU 
Animal Studies will host a conference on Animal Consciousness. 
 
This conference will bring together philosophers and scientists to discuss questions such as: Are invertebrates conscious? Do fish 
feel pain? Are non-human mammals self-conscious? How did consciousness evolve? How does research on animal consciousness 
affect the ethical treatment of animals? What is the impact of issues about animal consciousness on theories of consciousness and 
vice versa? What are the best methods for assessing consciousness in non-human animals? 
 
 
Speakers and panelists include: 
  
Colin Allen (University of Pittsburgh, Department of History & Philosophy of 
Science), Andrew Barron (Macquarie, Cognitive Neuroethology),  
Victoria Braithwaite (Penn State, Biology), Peter Carruthers (Maryland, 
Philosophy), Marian Dawkins (Oxford, Zoology), Dan Dennett (Tufts, 
Philosophy), David Edelman (San Diego, Neuroscience),  
Todd Feinberg (Mt. Sinai, Neurology), Peter Godfey-Smith (Sydney, 
Philosophy), Lori Gruen (Wesleyan, Philosophy), Brian Hare (Duke, Evolutionary 
Anthropology), Stevan Harnad (Montreal, Cognitive Science), Eva Jablonka (Tel 
Aviv, Cohn Institute), Björn Merker (Neuroscience), Diana Reiss (Hunter, 




Organizers: Ned Block, David Chalmers, Dale Jamieson, S. Matthew Liao. 
 
The conference will run from 9am on Friday November 17 to 6pm on Saturday 
November 18 at the NYU Cantor Film Center (36 E 8th St).  
 
Friday sessions will include “Invertebrates and the evolution of consciousness”, 
“Do fish feel pain?”, and “Animal consciousness and ethics”.  
 
Saturday sessions will include “Animal self-consciousness”, “Animal consciousness and theories of consciousness”, and a panel 
discussion.  
 
A detailed schedule will be circulated closer to the conference date. 
 
Registration is free but required.  
 
Register here.  
 
See also the conference website. 
